Abstract. Two games are inseparable by semivalues if both games obtain the same allocation whatever semivalue is considered. The problem of separability by semivalues reduces to separability from the null game. For four or more players, the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game by semivalues contains games different to zero-game. Now, for five or more players, the consideration of a priori coalition blocks in the player set allows us to reduce in a significant way the dimension of the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game. For these subspaces we provide basis formed by games of a particular type.
Introduction
Probabilistic values as solution concepts for cooperative games were introduced by Weber [11] in 1988. A probabilistic value assigns to each player a weighted sum of its marginal contributions to the coalitions, where the weighting coefficients form a probability distribution over the coalitions to which it belongs.
A particular type of probabilistic value is formed by the semivalues that were defined by Dubey, et al. [5] in 1981. In this case the weighting coefficients are independent of the players and they only depend on the coalition size. Semivalues represent a natural generalization of both the Shapley value [10] and the Banzhaf value [3, 7] .
It is possible to find two cooperative games that obtain the same payoff vector by each semivalue. We say that these games are inseparable by semivalues. By the linearity property of semivalues, we can reduce the problem of separability between games to separability from the null game. The vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game by semivalues is called shared kernel [1] and its dimension is 2 n − n 2 + n − 2, where n denotes the number of players. For spaces of cooperative games with four or more players, the shared kernel contains games different to the zero game
The probabilistic values are a wide family of solutions: given two different games, it is always possible to find a probabilistic value that separates them. The semivalues also form an important family of solutions. We can evaluate its largeness according to its ability to separate games. Two games are separable if their difference does not belong to the shared kernel. The dimension of this subspace would measure the impossibility of separation.
In this paper we consider a priori coalition blocks in the player set. Each coalition block is a group of players which decide to act together with respect to the rest of the players. The coalition blocks can be economic, political or social agents with affinities or common interests. The coalition blocks act as one unit in a first bargaining process. Later, a new bargaining process occurs among the members of each block. Thus, the existence of coalition blocks implies two levels of interaction among the players: first, among the coalition blocks, and second, within each coalition block.
A semivalue modified for games with coalition structure [2] applies the considered semivalue in both levels of interaction -indeed, as we will see later, the induced semivalues corresponding to both levels. -Our purpose is to reduce the dimension of the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game. For cooperative games with five or more players, the semivalues modified for games with coalition structure manage to reduce in a significant way the dimension of the shared kernel.
In addition, once an a priori ordering is chosen in the player set, the shared kernel is spanned by specific {−1, 0, 1}-valued games so-called shuffle games [1] . Now, we will prove that the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game by modified semivalues is spanned by games introduced here under the name of expanded shuffle games.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider the solution concepts of semivalue and semivalue modified for games with coalition structure. Also, nomenclature and main results for games inseparable by semivalues are described. Section 3 shows that shuffle games which are solutions to the problem of separability by semivalues do not have, in general, the same property with respect to separability by modified semivalues. In Section 4 two sufficient conditions for separability by modified semivalues are proposed. Finally, in Section 5 we determine the dimension and a basis for each vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game by modified semivalues.
Preliminaries

Cooperative games and semivalues
A cooperative game with transferable utility or TU game is a pair (N, v) , where N is a finite set of players, usually N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and v : 2 N → R is the so-called characteristic function, which assigns to every coalition S ⊆ N a real number v(S), the worth of coalition S, and satisfies the natural condition v(∅) = 0. We denote the set of all cooperative TU games on N by G N . For a given set of players N , we identify each game (N, v) with its characteristic function v.
A solution or a value on G N is a function Ψ : G N → R N which assigns to every game v a vector Ψ [v] with components Ψ i [v] for all i ∈ N and it represents a method to measure the negotiation strength of the players in the game. The vector space R N is called the allocation space. Semivalues as solution concepts were introduced and axiomatically characterized by Dubey et al. [5] . Given a game v ∈ G N and a semivalue ψ on G N , the allocation to each player is an average of the marginal contributions to the coalitions to which it belongs, Let α ∈ (0, 1). We call binomial semivalue ψ α to the semivalue whose coefficients are p n α,s = α s−1 (1−α) n−s for s = 1, . . . , n. Using the convention that 0 0 = 1, the definition makes sense also for α = 0 and α = 1. We respectively get the dictatorial index for α = 0 and the marginal index for α = 1: [3, 7] is the binomial semivalue for α = 1/2.
It is proven [2] that n distinct binomial semivalues form a reference system in Sem(G N ): given n distinct numbers α j in [0, 1], for each semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(G N ) there exists a unique family of coefficients
As it happens for the Banzhaf value, the allocation by each binomial semivalue can be computed by replacing in the partial derivatives of the MLE the variables by the value α [2]:
In addition, the allocation for any semivalue can be computed by means of a product of two matrices:
3) where the matrix B depends on each reference system of semivalues
and Λ is the column matrix of the coefficients of ψ in this reference system,
This way, a (n×n)-matrix summarizes the payments by any semivalue to all players of a given game v.
Modified semivalues
Given a semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(G N ) with weighting coefficients p n s , the recursively obtained numbers
define an induced semivalue ψ m on the space of cooperative games with m players (see, for instance, [4] ). Adding the initial semivalue, the family of induced semivalues {ψ m ∈ Sem(G M ) / 1 ≤ m ≤ n} allowed to define the concept of semivalue modified for games with coalition structure [2] following a similar process to that used by Owen to derive the coalition value [8] from the Shapley value or the modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure [9] from the Banzhaf value.
We denote a coalition structure in
. . , m} is the set of classes in N given by the coalition structure B. For each K ⊆ B j , we define a modified quotient game
where K = B j \ K. This is the game played by the partition classes with the exception of B j , that is replaced by the subset K. Since the game u Bj |K is defined on a set M with m players (1 ≤ m ≤ n), we can apply the induced semivalue ψ m :
The value w j (K) denotes the strategic position of the subset K ⊆ B j if this subset directly negotiates with the other classes as players in the quotient game, according to the semivalue ψ, in absence of K = B j \ K.
Next, since the game w j is defined on B j , a set with
, we can apply the induced semivalue ψ bj and we define the semivalue ψ modified by the coalition structure B as
The semivalue ψ has acted twice: among the coalition blocks and within the coalition block to which the player i belongs. An explicit expression for the allocations according to modified semivalues is derived in [2] :
(2.4) For the coalition structures with individual blocks, B i = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {n}}, and grand coalition, B t = {{1, 2, . . . , n}}, the modified allocations agree with the allocation by the initial semivalue.
Also, the allocations by modified semivalues can be computed by means of a product of matrices, once a reference system of binomial semivalues has been chosen: 
The function g j is a multilinear function related with the game v and the coalition block B j . It is valid for all players in the coalition block B j . One can find a detailed proof and several examples of this procedure to compute allocations by modified semivalues in [2] .
Separability by semivalues
We say that two games v, v ∈ G N such that v = v are separable by a solution Ψ on
Since semivalues verify linearity, we only consider separability from the null game. Grouping these conditions according to coalition sizes, the freedom degrees for each s with 2 ≤ s ≤ n−2 are n s − n, whereas v(S) = 0 for |S| = 1, n−1, n. This way, the dimension of C N is 2 n − n
In game spaces G N with cardinality |N | ≥ 4, for a given coalition S ⊆ N and players i, j ∈ S and k, l ∈ N \ S, we define the shuffle game v S,i,j,k,l as
where 1 S is the unity game in G N (1 S (S) = 1 and 1
, it is proven that the shared kernel is spanned by shuffle games. Since each shuffle game takes non null values uniquely on coalitions of a single size, the number of selected games in the proof of this property is n s − n for coalitions S with 2 ≤ s ≤ n − 2 (|S| = s).
Shuffle games and coalition structures
Proposition 3.1. Let f v = f v (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) be the MLE of a game v ∈ G N . v ∈ C N ⇔ ∇f v (α) = 0 ∀α ∈ [0, 1], α = (α, α, . . . , α). Proof. If v ∈ C N , then ψ[v] = 0 ∀ψ ∈ Sem(G N ). In particular, for every binomial semivalue ψ α with α ∈ [0, 1], ψ α [v] = ∇f v (α) = 0 where α = (α, . . . ,
α).
Conversely, since n binomial semivalues form a reference system in Sem(G N ), every semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(G N ) can uniquely be written
and the game v belongs to the shared kernel C N . Example 3.2. Let N = {i, j, k, l} be the set of players. For cooperative games with four players the coalition S in the shuffle games is only composed by two players. For short, when S = {i, j} we write the shuffle game
It is easy to see that ∇f v i,j,k,l (α) = 0 ∀α ∈ [0, 1], as one expects for a game inseparable from the null game by semivalues. The above definition introduces our central concept of separability between games by modified semivalues. According to the linearity property, the concept reduces to separability from the null game. Now, shuffle games that give the solution to the problem of separability by semivalues, offer a different answer according to the cardinality of the player set. From now on we will use the MLE f v2,4,
Case (b). We consider, for instance, the coalition structure B = {{1, 2},{3}, {4}}. According to the rules that lead to the terms in expression (2.6) for obtaining the value ψ 1 [v 2,4,3,1 ; B] by means of a product of matrices as in (2.5), we first determine the modified MLE g 1 :
Written any semivalue ψ as a linear combination of four different binomial semivalues, we can conclude that Conversely, if a game is inseparable from the null game by modified semivalues, in particular, it is inseparable from the null game by semivalues. It suffices to consider the coalition structure formed by individual blocks.
Proposition 3.5. Let G N a vector space of cooperative TU games with five or more players. Every shuffle game in G N is separable from the null game by semivalues modified for games with coalition structure.
Proof. In G N with |N | ≥ 5, the shuffle game v S,i,j,k,
For coalitions S with 2 ≤ |S| < n− 2, we consider the coalition structure B S = {S, N \ S}. The modified MLE g 1 for players in block S is
where N \ (S ∪ {k, l}) = ∅ since |S| < n−2. Then, the modified Banzhaf value β separates the game v S,i,j,k,l , 2 ≤ |S| < n−2, from the null game:
For case |S| = n−2, S = N \ {k, l} and the MLE is
Now, we consider the coalition structure B N \{k,l} = {N \ {k, l}, {k, l}} and we obtain the modified MLE g 1 for players in block N \ {k, l}:
where N \ {i, j, k, l} = ∅ since |N | ≥ 5. Let h be a player in N \ {i, j, k, l}. Again, the modified Banzhaf value β separates the game v N \{k,l},i,j,k,l from the null game:
Sufficient conditions of separability
In the previous section we have seen that, for games with five or more players, the shuffle games do not solve the problem of inseparability by semivalues modified for games with coalition structure. In this section we provide two sufficient conditions of separability, that is, two necessary conditions of inseparability from the null game by modified semivalues.
The inseparability from the null game by semivalues demands a certain condition of complementarity for the coalitions of extreme sizes: v(N ) = v(∅) = 0 and v(N \ {i}) = v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N (see (2.7) and subsequent comment). Proposition 4.1 will show that this condition of complementarity must extend to all coalitions S and N \ S in order to assure the inseparability by modified semivalues.
Later, once the first necessary condition is assumed (v(S) = v(N \ S) ∀S ⊆ N ), Proposition 4.2 will introduce a more elaborated requirement: the utility of each coalition must reduce to the utility of all contained bipersonal coalitions. The bipersonal coalitions are the most elementary coalition blocks, since in our context, the unipersonal coalitions obtain null utility. A game with a coalition whose utility is not the sum of utilities of its contained bipersonal coalitions can be separated from the null game by a certain coalition structure and a certain semivalue. Proof. Let us suppose S a coalition with smallest size that verifies v(S ) = v(N \ S ). If |S | = 1, the game v is separable from the null game by semivalues and also by modified semivalues. We can consider that |S | = s ≥ 2 and s ≤ n/2. Then, the MLE of the game v can be written as
Now, we choose the coalition structure B S = {S , N \ S }. In such a case, the modified MLE g 1 for players in coalition block S has by expression
because the terms for coalitions S containing elements as well in S as in N \ S vanish in the MLE g 1 . If k is a player in S ,
i∈S \{k}
\S ) and the modified Banzhaf value β separates the game v from the null game: Proof. The MLE of a game v that satisfies the two first conditions of the statement can be written as
where the second sum only appears in case n even number. Let us suppose S a coalition with smallest size that verifies (4.1) for |S | < n/2. In such a case, we choose the coalition structure B S = {S , N \ S } and we write the modified MLE g 1 for the players in the coalition block S :
Next, we consider a certain player j 1 in the block S , we compute the partial derivative of the MLE g 1 with respect to the variable x j1 and we replace all variables by the generic value α by grouping the sums as follows:
All terms for coalitions S with S j 1 and 2 ≤ s < s − 1 can be written by means of coalitions T with T j 1 and 3 ≤ t < s . Then,
We shorten the polynomial (1 − α)
by means of p s (α) and we write v(S \{j 1 }) as a sum of utilities of contained bipersonal coalitions:
It is possible to find coalitions S with S ⊂ S , S j 1 and 2 < s < s only in case s ≥ 4. Then, the last sum in the above expression can be written as
where case s = 1 + s /2 is not considered, since the size of S only can take value s = 1 + s /2 in case s even number but, in this case, the coefficient α
In the above sums, we can identify coalitions S for 3 ≤ s < 1 + s /2 with coalitions T for 1 + s /2 < t ≤ s − 1 by means of t = s − s + 2. Then, both sums reduce to
Let us suppose S = {j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j s }. For a given cardinality s with 3 ≤ s < 1+s /2, the last difference of sums vanish, because it can be written as
Thus, from expression (4.3), we can write the modified binomial semivalue ψ α for a certain player j 1 ∈ S as
Since α = 1/2 is the unique real zero of the polynomial p s for values s ≥ 3 and the game v satisfies the inequality (4.1) for the coalition S , we conclude that (ψ α ) j1 [v; B S ] = 0 for values α ∈ (0, 1/2) ∪ (1/2, 1) and these modified semivalues separate the game v from the null game. Finally, we have to see the case |S| = n/2, when n/2 is the smallest size of the coalitions that verify condition (4.1) in the statement. Here, n is an even number and all coalitions in the second sum of expression (4.2), for |S| = n/2, can be grouped by pairs: S and N \ S with v(N \ S) = v(S). Now, the selected coalition for the procedure S will belong to one or another half of the coalitions with size n/2; we choose half that contains coalition S and describe the second sum with S as the same way that the first sum in expression (4.2). Then, by repeating the same procedure as in case |S| < n/2, we reach the same conclusion.
Expanded shuffle games
In this section we define a particular type of games related to the shuffle games that verify both necessary conditions of inseparability introduced in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. We denote by D N the vector subspace of all cooperative games in G N inseparable from the null game by semivalues modified for games with coalition structure. 
Proof. It is easy to prove sections (a) and (b); it suffices to check if the players i, j, k, l belong or not to each coalition S, since the unique bipersonal coalitions that take non-null values in game v In order to demonstrate that the game v e i,j,k,l , k, l ∈ N \ {i, j}, is inseparable by modified semivalues, we can consider that the players i, j, k, l are distributed in different coalition blocks in the same way that in the proof of Proposition 3.4. The remaining players N \ {i, j, k, l} will be distributed in the different blocks next to the players i, j, k, l or they will form new coalition blocks.
Since the variables that correspond to the players in N \ {i, j, k, l} does not appear in the MLE of the game v e i,j,k,l , when we compute allocations for the players i, j, k, l by means of a product of matrices as in (2.5), we obtain the same result as in Proposition 3.4, that is,
For the remaining players, ψ q [v Proof. We can see in [1] that the shared kernel C N for |N | ≥ 4 is spanned by 2 n − n 2 + n − 2 shuffle games whose coalitions with non-null value vary from size s = 2 to size s = n − 2. We choose the n 2 − n shuffle games with coalition size 2. Since they are linearly independent in G N , its expanded games are also linearly independent and, by above Proposition, inseparable from the null game by modified semivalues. The linear subspace spanned by these expanded shuffle games is contained in the subspace D N for |N | ≥ 5.
In addition, because D N ⊆ C N , the freedom degrees in C N by a consequence of conditions (2. 
Concluding remark
It is known that every cooperative game with two or three players is separable from the null game by semivalues, i.e., dim C N = 0 in cases |N | = 2, 3. Consequently, the vector subspace D N only contains the null game if |N | = 2, 3. For games with four players, Proposition 3.4 proves that both separability concepts coincide:
For games with five or more players, the introduction of semivalues modified for games with coalition structure allows us to reduce in a significant way the dimension of the vector subspace of games inseparable from the null game.
The difference of dimensions between the vector subspaces C N and D N shows us how much wider the family of modified semivalues is than the family of semivalues, according to the ability to separate games from the null game. By linearity, the separability between two games is reduced by both solution concepts to separability of their difference from the null game. The ability of separation by semivalues has remarkably increased by the introduction of a priori coalition structures.
